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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Utah Chapter of the Sierra Ciub
and Grand Canyon Trust,

Appeal No. 20050454

Petitioners,
Agency Decision: Order Re
Petitions to Intervene in the
Matter of Unit 3, Intermountain
Power Service Corporation,
Millard County, Utah

vs.
Utah Air Quality Board,
Respondent, and
Intermountain Power Service Corp.,
Respondent/Intervenor.

REPLY BRIEF OF
SIERRA CLUB AND GRAND CANYON TRUST

Petitioners Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club and Grand Canyon Trust (collectively
"Sierra Club") respectfully submit this Reply Brief further supporting their request for an
order reversing the decision by the Utah Air Quality Board ("Board") denying the Sierra
Club standing. Thereby, Sierra Club seeks a ruling granting it the opportunity to
adjudicate, before the Board, the legality of the Approval Order ("AO") issued by the
Executive Secretary of the Board ("Executive Secretary") permitting the construction and
operation of the 950 megawatt Intermountain Power Service Corporation ("IPSC") coalfired power plant.

b

As outlined below, the Board's determination should be reversed because: 1) all
facts alleged by Sierra Club supporting standing must be accepted as true; 2) the
determination deserves no deference as it is a legal queslion outside the expertise of the
Board and the Board misapplied the general law of standing; and 3) based on the
undisputed evidence in the record, Sierra Club has established standing under each of the
three tests articulated under Utah law. In reversing the Board's order, this Court should
conclude that Sierra Club has standing and may proceed to challenge the issuance of the
AO before the Board.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I.

The Standard of Review is Correction of Error and the Board's
Determination Deserves No Deference,
In its recitation of the standard of review, the Board begins with the correct

analysis, citing Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 P.2d 372, 373-74 (Utah 1997),
for the proposition that standing is primarily a question of law, "although there may be
factual findings that bear on the issue." Board Brief at 2. As the Board acknowledges,
this Court further held that
[b]ecause of the important policy considerations involved in granting or denying
standing, we will closely review trial court determinations of whether a given set
of facts fits the legal requirements for standing, granting minimal discretion to the
trial court.
Board Brief at 2-3 (quoting Kearns-Tribune at 373).
Thus, based on the analysis the Board puts forward, its subsequent reference to a
standard of review entailing "varying degrees of strictness" is misleading. Board Brief at

2

4; IPSC Brief at 11-13. Rather, as Kearns-Tribune made clear, in the context of standing,
this Court will grant only "minimal" discretion to a trial court. In the case of a citizen
board, with no expertise in "general" legal matters such as standing, a Utah court will be
even less deferential, giving "no" deference to its decision in light of the court's '"power
and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the
jurisdiction.'" Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n of Utah, 2000 UT 66, ^ 14, 7 P.3d 777; see
also Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Utah, 754 P.2d 41, 50 (Utah 1988) ("When
reviewing the [agency's] interpretation of general questions of law, this Court applies a
correction-of-error standard, granting no deference to [agency] decisions").
This conclusion does not conflict with the discussion of the standard of review in
Sierra Club v. Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335, 341 (Utah
App. 1998), cited by the Board. Board Brief at 4-5. Importantly, the Court of Appeals
set forth this standard of review after it determined that Sierra Club had standing on
I
behalf of its members to challenge a decision by the Waste Control Board approving a
permit modification and trial burns of chemical weapons, and therefore was not
discussing the standard of review relative to standing. Id. Moreover, the court clarified
that to decide the discretion to accord an agency applying law to fact it will "consider
'factors such as policy concerns and an agency's expertise.'" Id. As explained above,
this Court has already determined that policy considerations require the courts to "say
what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." Esquivel,
2000 UT 66,114, 7 P.3d 777. In addition, a citizen Board entrusted with "maintain[ing]
I
levels of air quality which will protect human health and safety," Utah Code Ann. § 19-23

101(2) (2004), has no expertise in determining whether an entity has standing under Utah
law. See Williams v. PSC 754 P.2d at 50.
II.

The Facts Alleged by Sierra Club Supporting Standing Must Be Accepted as
True.
The Board next takes issue with Sierra Club's reliance on Adkins v. Bd. of Oil

Gas & Mining, 926 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 1996) to argue Ihat because the Board's decision
denying Sierra Club standing was akin to granting a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
Sierra Club's undisputed factual allegations contained in the Administrative Record must
be taken as true. Board Brief at 3-4; IPSC Brief at 16-17.l Rather, the Board maintains,
its decision is more like a ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Assuming for the
purposes of argument that this is true, the result is the same - Sierra Club's factual
allegations are accepted as true and there is no deference to the Board's decision.

1

Actually, the Board's ruling is akin to the granting of a Utah Rules Civil Procedure Rule
12(b)(1) motion. This is because, "as applied to the categories supplied by the rules, the
defect of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction." Haase v. Sessions, 835
F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist, 475
U.S. 534, 541 (1986)) (classifying lack of standing as a defect in the court's subject
matter jurisdiction). The Hasse court therefore found, the "conversion feature" of Rule
12(b)(6), which changes a 12(b)(6) motion to a motion for summary judgment if matters
outside the pleadings are introduced, does not apply. Id. As a result, the case dismissing
Haase's case for want of standing "procedurally should have been limited, at least absent
a sua sponte directive from the court or a summary judgment filing from the government,
to a review of Haase's allegations, and supporting materials, if submitted." Id. (noting
that summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party believed an allegation to
be a "sham" and therefore not capable of proof). The court concluded that "[a]s a general
matter, a plaintiffs standing to pursue a claim rests on the theory of injury presented in
the complaint and the facts alleged in support of the claim." Id at 907.
2
One reason the facts alleged in Sierra Club's Request for Agency Action are undisputed
is because no party filed an answer to that pleading. As a result, the facts alleged must be
4

This first principle is evident because "[sjummary judgment is granted only when 'there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact' and 'the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.'" Fennell v. Green, 2003 UT App 291, % 6, 77 P.3d 339
(citing Beardenv. Croft, 2001 UT 76,H 5, 31 P.3d 537) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
Moreover, these conclusions must follow after an "examination] [of] all of the facts
presented and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party," Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Company, 2003 UT 8, <J| 20, 70 P.3d 1
(2003) (emphasis added); House v. Armour of America, Inc., 886 P.2d 542, 545 (Utah
1994) (same). Thus, in ruling on Sierra Club's standing as a motion for summary
judgment, the Board would have necessarily concluded that there are no genuine issues as
to material facts and interpreted the facts the Sierra Club presented, as contained in the
Administrative Record, in the manner most favorable to the organization.
The second principle, that this court will not defer to the Board's summary
judgment-like standing decision, is true "because summary judgment is granted as a
matter of law rather than fact" and this court "will review the legal conclusions . . . for
correctness." House v. Armour of America, 929 P.2d 340, 342-43 (Utah 1996); Bonham
v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989) ("because, by definition, summary judgments
do not resolve factual issues, this Court reviews those conclusions for correctness,
without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions"). As a result, in
reviewing a summary judgment, "it is improper for the trial court or this court on appeal

taken as true and the Board's decision is more like a 12(b) decision, made on the basis of
Sierra Club's pleadings, without the benefit of an answer.
5

to weigh the evidence or assess its credibility." House, 886 P.2d at 545 (further citations
omitted). Thus, regardless of whether the Board's decision is treated like a grant of a
Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, the Board's
decision is given no deference. Moreover, the facts Sierra Club alleges in the
Administrative Record, which were not contested by the Board or any party, must be
accepted as true, and inferences made in a light most favorable to Sierra Club.
Most importantly, based on information in the Administrative Record, chiefly the
uncontested affidavits of Sierra Club members, there is ample evidence to determine that
Sierra Club does indeed have standing to contest the AO1. See Soc'y of Prof 1 Journalists
v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1172-73 (Utah 1987) ("[b]ecause standing questions are
usually raised prior to the introduction of any evidence, we will necessarily be required to
make a judgment whether proof of... a causal relationship is difficult or impossible and
whether the relief requested is substantially likely to redress the injury claimed") (quoting
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983).J As Sierra Club establishes in its
Opening Brief and confirms again in this reply, it has standing by virtue of imminent
injury from the AO to its members' particularized interests in their good health, the
health of their families, their economic well-being and their ability to enjoy their
Thus, there is no need for remand, indeed it would be improper to remand this matter to
the Board for fact finding. With regard to the issue of standing, the parties have had the
opportunity to contest the evidence in the record and the Board has had the opportunity to
make factual findings relative to any allegedly disputed facts. However, neither did so.
Therefore, the record is complete. At the same time, there is ample uncontested evidence
in the record, for example, in the Member Affidavits, to confirm Sierra Club's standing.
Finally, as Soc'y of Prof 1 Journalists makes clear, a standing decision is to be made early
in a proceeding, prior to the introduction of much evidence, and can be based on this
Court's legal conclusions regarding causality and redressability.
6

environment. The evidence in the record is plainly sufficient to establish that the Sierra
Club has standing based on the important public issues it raises, in which no one has a
greater interest and which would go unresolved but for the organization's challenge of
the AO. By the same token, the conclusion follows readily from the record that Sierra
Club has standing based on the critical statutory issues it brings to the Board, which are
just of the type that the Board was created to resolve.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
In accepting Sierra Club's description of the nature of this case, the Board states

only that "the facts on quantities of pollutants [to be emitted from the IPSC coal-fired
power plant as authorized by AO] have not been submitted as evidence to the Board."
Board Brief at 6. The Board's assertion is ill-conceived. Actually, as the organization
cited in its Opening Brief, Sierra Club included these specific authorized emissions in its
Request for Agency Action. AR at 010 (stating that the AO allows the proposed IPSC
facility to emit, each year 13,000 tons of air pollutants, or 496.5 tons of PM (as measured
by PMio); 2,775 tons of NO x ; 3,567.5 tons of S0 2 ; 5,946 tons of CO; and 107 tons of
VOCs; as well as 199 tons of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs), including mercury); see
also AR at 032 & 151. The Board itself designated the Administrative Record, including
the Request for Agency Action. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (2004). Therefore,
the Board cannot now suggest that these undisputed facts were not before it for the
purposes of its standing decision. See Board's Response to Sierra Club's Motion to

I

Supplement Records at 2 ("The revised Record Index contains a listing of all documents
of the Utah Air Quality Board in this matter."); Id. at 3 ("The Board . . . only considers
the documents and evidence that it receives as part of the adjudicative process").
II.

The Member Affidavits Must be Accepted As True.
IPSC suggests that Sierra Club's Member Affidavits are "inadmissible" and "of no

evidentiary value because the affiants lacked 'personal knowledge' and were not
'competent' to testify regarding many of the matters contained in the affidavits." IPSC
Brief at 7-9. For several reasons, this assertion is of no weight.
First, because IPSC did not contest the admissibility of the Member Affidavits
before the Board, it cannot do so now. This is because "[a] party's failure to object to the
evidentiary sufficiency of an affidavit results in the party waiving the right to object to
the admitted evidence on appeal." Litster v. Utah Valley Community College, 881 P. 2d
933, 936, n. 2 (Utah App. 1994) (citing D & L Supply v. Saurint 775 P.2d 420, 421
(Utah 1989); Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. Allred, 685 P.2d 544, 546 (Utah 1984)) (further
citations omitted).4 Indeed, this Court specifically applied this rule in the face of Norton
v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983), the case cited by IPSC. IPSC Brief at 7.
While acknowledging "inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a motion
for summary judgment," D & L Supply, 775 P.2d at 421 (citing Norton v. Blackham at
4

In Litster, the Court of Appeals specifically distinguished between an evidentiary and a
legal challenge to an affidavit, emphasizing that motion to strike at the trial court level
was necessary to preserve the option to such an evidentiary challenge on appeal. A
challenge to an affidavit based on whether it creates a disputed fact is a legal challenge
and is preserved Here, IPSC made no evidentiary challenge to the facts contained in the
affidavits.
8

859), as well as "evidentiary problems" with the contested affidavit, this Court concluded
that defendant had "waived these errors when he failed to object at the trial court." D &L
Supply, 775 P.2d at 421 (citing Hobelman Motors, Inc. v. Alfred, 685 P.2d 544, 546
(Utah 1984); Franklin Fin, v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983)
(even if affidavits in support of summary judgment were defective, party opposing
summary judgment motion failed to move to strike and was deemed to have waived his
opposition to evidentiary defects)). Here, while IPSC argued before the Board that Sierra
Club members' statements are a "collection of'generalized' grievances and subjective
fears and beliefs that lack any evidentiary value," IPSC did not file a motion to strike or
otherwise challenge the admissibility of the affidavits or any of the statements they
contained. IPSC Opposition to Sierra Club Standing (AR 085-099). As a result, IPSC
has waived its opportunity to contest the admissibility of these affidavits now.
Second, assuming for the sake of argument that IPSC had contested the
admissibility of Member Affidavits before the Board, the corporation is still prevented
from challenging them on appeal. This is because the Board has stated clearly that it has
accepted, without reservation, the factual declarations in the Member Affidavits. Le^ see
Board Order at 4, AR at 267; Board Brief at 4 ("In making its findings on the standing
issue, the Board was applying the facts in the Sierra Club's affidavits to the legal
standard") (emphasis added); Id. at 8 (stating Board "accepts Sierra Club's representation
of the facts as it concerns the affidavits of said Sierra Club members"). As IPSC has not

9

cross-appealed the Board's decision to accept the statements in the Member Affidavits as
true, IPSC cannot now find fault with the Board's decision to do so.5
Third, the Member Affidavits reflect members' personal knowledge, beliefs,
opinions, interests and injuries. As the members themselves are intimately acquainted
with their own knowledge, their own opinions, their own beliefs, their own interests and
their own imminent injuries, they are in the best position to attest to these facts. By the
same token their competency in making these statements cannot be questioned.
Moreover, such personal statements are entirely appropriate given that members must
show "some distinct and palpable" or "particularized" injury that gives them "a personal
stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." Soc'y of Prof 1 Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1172
(citations omitted); see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt'l Svcs., Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 183 (2000) ("The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing . . . is
not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff) (emphasis added).
Finally, the statements of the affiants are substantiated by Sierra Club's Request
for Agency Action, which is also clearly part of the record and has also not been
disputed. For example, Mr. Trimble states that "I believe that the emissions from the
operation of the proposed expansion will impair the visibility from, and of the area
around my Torrey home and the places I enjoy visiting," Trimble Aff. % 10, including
Capitol Reef, Zion, Bryce and Canyonlands national parks. Id. f 6. Sierra Club's
Request for Agency Action alleges, and it has not been disputed that, inter alia, the
5

In other words, assuming IPSC contested the admissibility of the affidavits, the Board
ruled against IPSC and accepted the affidavits as fact. Because IPSC did not crossappeal that ruling, it cannot challenge the affidavits on an evidentiary basis.
10

proposed project will contribute to Class I S0 2 increment violations at Capitol Reef
National Park, AR at 018-019, and that the Executive Secretary failed to require a
complete cumulative Class I increment analysis and failed to address adequately
significant impacts on visibility in Utah's Class I areas. AR at 020-021. Similarly, Mr.
Bloxham, often with his family, travels extensively in Millard County and has repeatedly
visited Delta, Utah. Bloxham Aff. ^ 5-6. Mr. Bloxham believes that emissions from the
IPSC facility authorized by the AO will adversely impact his health, the health of his
family, visibility and the ecosystem values of these places. Id. ^ 8, 10-11. Sierra Club's
Request for Agency Action alleges, and it has not been disputed that, inter alia, the IPSC
facility is authorized to emit more air pollutants and HAPs than legally allowed because
the Executive Secretary failed to comply with MACT and BACT. AR at 010-017. In
addition, Sierra Club alleged that because the Executive Secretary failed to require
adequate analysis before authorizing the AO, the facility is permitted, without a sufficient
basis, to emit annually thousands of tons of air pollutants that are likely in excess of legal
limits. See Le., AR at 017 (alleging a failure to consider, cumulatively, the impacts of the
two existing IPSC Units with the impacts of the proposed power plant on the NAAQS
and PSD increments); AR 018-019 (Class I S0 2 increment violations at Capitol Reef).
III.

The Statements of the Millard County Commissioner Do Not Dispute the
Member Affidavits of the Request for Agency Action.
IPSC seems to suggest that "testimony" by a Millard County Commissioner

disputes Sierra Club's Request for Agency Action. Le. IPSC Brief at 10-11. However,
the Commissioner's statements say nothing about integrated gasification combined cycle
U

technology, supercritical pulverized coal boiler technology, best available control
technology, maximum available control technology, S0 2 emission limits, greenhouse
gases, coal chemistry data, continuous opacity monitoring, control of mercury emissions,
NO x emission limits, impacts on soils and vegetation, cumulative impacts, PMi0
monitored values, the Utah County PMi0 nonattainment area, Class I S0 2 increment
violations at Capitol Reef National Park, Class I increment analysis, impacts on visibility
in Utah's Class I areas, PMi0 increment consumption, the affirmative defense provision,
or the opportunity for the public to comment on application revisions. Therefore these
statements do not dispute Sierra Club's Request for Agency Action.6 Moreover, IPSC
cannot argue that the Commissioner's testimony disputes the declarations in the Member
Affidavits. This is because these affidavits represent members' personal knowledge,
beliefs, opinions, interests and injuries, about which the Commissioner knows nothing.
See Soc'v of Prof 1 Journalists, 743 P.2d at 1172 (plaintiff must show "particularized"
injury and "personal stake" in the outcome of the dispule); Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183.

6

To the extent that the Commissioner testified as health impacts, he only made
statements as to the effects of the existing facility and not the effects of the emissions of
the proposed facility, nor the cumulative effects of the air pollutants from the entire
complex. Similarly, the Commissioner spoke only of property values in Millard County,
not in Boulder and Torrey, Utah, where Mr. Cass and Mr. Trimble own property.
Finally, his assertions regarding visibility did not refute the allegation that emissions
from the facility would impair visibility in Millard County or in Utah's National Parks.
Rather, the Commissioner stated only that astrophysicists were "hoping to put a cosmic
ray experiment just west of IPP" and made no assertions about the impact on visibility
from the proposed IPSC facility. AR at 274 (Standing Tr. at 22,ffi[4-17).
12

IV.

Judicial Notice of Exhibits "F" and "G" is Appropriate,
The Board contends that exhibits "F" and "G" should not be considered by this

Court because they are not part of the Administrative Record. Board Brief at 2; IPSC
Brief at 6. These contentions miss the mark. Sierra Club never suggests that these
exhibits are part of the Administrative Record, but instead specifically asks this Court to
take judicial notice of these public records and the information in them. Opening Brief at
11-12, n.4. Judicial notice of Exhibit "F" is appropriate because it is a public record
containing background information, printed from the EPA's website, summarizing
findings published in the federal register and explaining the basis for the regulation of
and standards for air pollutants. Moreover, a similar EPA pamphlet, also citing the health
and environmental impacts of these air pollutants, appears of the website of the Division
of Air Quality. These records are therefore "generally known" and "capable of accurate
and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned." Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 201(b). Similarly, as Exhibit "G" is an
excerpt from the federal register, judicial notice of this record is also appropriate.
IPSC advances a similar argument, suggesting that Sierra Club cannot ask that this
Court take judicial notice of material it did not present to the Board. IPSC Brief at 6
(citing an Oklahoma case). This argument fails. In Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn,
2003 UT 50, H 31, n. 8; 84 P.3d 1134, this Court specifically rejected such an approach

7

DAQ, Ambient Air Quality in Utah, available at: http://www.airquality.utah.gov/annualreport/AmbientAirQuality.htm#CriteriaAir (last visited Dec. 18, 2005)
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by taking judicial notice of a fact, contained in a State Engineer record, that was not
introduced to the trial court. Moreover, in the present case, taking judicial notice of facts
concerning the health and environmental impacts of air pollutants that were not
introduced to the Board is particularly warranted. This is because, under Utah law, Board
members "shall be knowledgeable of air pollution matters/' Utah Code Ann. § 19-2103(2) (2004), and therefore, presumably aware of the health and environmental impacts
of regulated air pollutants. This Court, however, may not be similarly familiar with air
pollution matters, making the presentation of such public records appropriate.
ARGUMENT
I.

Sierra Club has a Personal Stake in the Outcome of Board Review of the AO.
By virtue of its members' affidavits, Sierra Club has established particularized

injuries and interests that give it a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute. Its
members advanced undisputed allegations of personal and distinct injury, and genuine,
imminent harms. In these affidavits and its Request for Agency Act, the organization has
demonstrated a causal relationship between the anticipated injuries of its members and
the construction and operation of the IPSC facility as authorized by the AO. Sierra Club
has also shown that the relief it requests will provide "a remedy" for members5 injuries,
as the laws and processes the members seek to enforce are designed specifically to limit
air pollution and to protect human health, the environment and visibility.
In an attempt to counter Sierra Club's showing that it qualifies under the first
standing test, the Board and IPSC rely on various arguments, each of which is readily
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dismissed. The focus of IPSC's argument is that Sierra Club has not raised "credible" or
"reliable" evidence to establish particularized injury, causation, or redressibility. IPSC
Brief at 21-27. IPSC's assertions are without merit. First, IPSC wants to characterize
Sierra Club's Request for Agency Action as unsupported and not credible. However, this
approach ignores that for the purposes of this inquiry, the Request for Agency Action is
not in dispute as there is no evidence in the record that contests the allegations Sierra
Club advances in that pleading. Similarly, whether the Board's decision is taken as a
granting of a 12(b) or summary judgment motion, all of the facts presented and the
inferences to be drawn therefrom will be taken in the light most favorable to Sierra Club.
Taking a similar tack, IPSC suggests that to demonstrate causation and
redressibility, Sierra Club must show, for example "how many emissions would be cut if
a 'super critical' boiler were installed" and must establish that these reductions would
alleviate its members injuries. IPSC Brief at 26. Again, IPSC is mistaken. In its Request
for Agency Action, Sierra Club does allege that the installation of a super critical boiler
would reduce emissions. AR at 012 ("Further, such supercritical boilers achieve up to
17% lower emissions rates of carbon monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NO x ) and sulfur
dioxides (SOx), as well as up to 15% lower PM emission rates"). Moreover, IPSC's
interpretation of the causation and redressibility requirement ignores this Court's holding
that "[b]ecause standing questions are usually raised prior to the introduction of any
evidence, we will necessarily be required to make a judgment whether proof of such a
causal relationship is difficult or impossible and whether the relief requested is
substantially likely to redress the injury claimed." Soc'v of ProPl Journalists, 743 P.2d at
15

1172-73. Based on Sierra Club's Request for Agency Action and the expressed intent of
the relevant state and federal statutes to limit emissions and protect human health and the
environment, the judgment is readily made that there is a causal relationship between
approval of the AO, the threatened injuries and the relief requested, which would
"reduce55 the alleged injury. To require Sierra Club to "prove55 causation and
redressability in the manner IPSC suggests would lead to an untenable result, making the
"standing hurdle55 higher than that for proving Sierra Club's claims on the merits. See
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183 (holding that the "standing hurdle55 cannot be higher "than the
necessary showing for success on the merits . . .55).
IPSC's reliance on Washington County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003
UT 58, 82 P.3d 1125, is also not instructive. In that case, a water conservancy district
challenged approval of a water use application because the district feared the water
withdrawal would interfere with its water rights. However, the trial court determined
"[a]fter hearing conflicting testimony on the[] issue, that the conservancy district has not
carried its burden of showing a connection between its own water use and that of the
CPB... .55 Id. at Tf 25. As a result, the court concluded that the conservancy district did
not have standing to bring its action because it could not show that it would be injured as
a result of the applicant's water use. Here, in contrast, there has been no "conflicting
testimony55 and no factual determination by the Board. Rather, on the basis of undisputed
fact, Sierra Club has established causation between the Executive Secretary's issuance of
the AO and the imminent harm to its members. Opening Brief at 28-31.
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IPSC also mistakenly argues that because members allege injuries and interests
"shared by the public at large," these injuries cannot be particularized. IPSC Brief at 24.
However, IPSC mischaracterizes the members' injuries and interests. Sierra Club
members make statements only about their own health, the health of their own families,
their own economic well-being, and their own ability to appreciate the vistas and
ecosystems of the places where they live and visit. See Opening Brief at 14-18.
Certainly, Mr. Bloxham's interest in himself and his own injuries, Mr. Trimble's interest
in himself and his injuries, and Mr. Cass' interest in himself and his injuries are not
shared by the public at large. To deem otherwise would lead to an absurd result - the
more universal and widespread the impacts of a proposed government action the less
likely any person individually injured by the action could establish standing.

8

Finally, IPSC cites Center for Biological Diversity v. Lueckel 417 F.3d 532 (6m Cir.
2005) to argue that Sierra Club has failed to demonstrate Article III standing. Initially,
IPSC ignores the numerous standing cases cited by Sierra Club in the context of air
pollution. See Opening Brief at 38-39. In these cases, federal courts have routinely
granted standing to parties alleging harm from even minimal amounts of air pollution.
This approach and its instructive value to the present inquiry was recently confirmed in
Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Mason, 414 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2005). There, the
federal circuit court held that a conservation organization had standing to challenge the
National Park Service's failure to adequately consider air quality impacts to National
Parks that would result from a permit issued to a coal-fired power plant. The court ruled
that as "an organization dedicated to the conservation of, and whose members make use
of, public lands, [the organization] suffers a cognizable injury from environmental
damage to those lands" resulting from increased air emissions. Id. at 4. The Court also
determined that the organizations' injuries could be redressed by a new proceeding before
the state air quality board assessing whether the power plant would cause or contribute to
an adverse impact on visibility in Class I areas. Id. at 6.
Secondly, Center for Biological Diversity is not instructive to the present inquiry.
In that case the Center alleged that the Forest Service unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed compliance with the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. Id. at 534. The
Court held that plaintiffs' claims of inaction failed to confer standing because "plaintiffs
17

II.

Sierra Club Raises Important Public Issues Otherwise Unlikely To Be Raised,
In Which No One Else Has a Greater Interest.
As Sierra Club's Request for Agency Action makes clear, the organization raises

"important public issues" where "no one else has a greater interest in the oulcome, the
issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless" Sierra Club is granted standing and "the
legal issues are sufficiently crystallized to be subject to judicial resolution." Nat'l Parks
and Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1994) (hereafter
"Nat'l Parks"). This is because the organization brings up "important issues regarding
the lawfulness of governmental action [that] ought to be judicially resolved" because they
are "presented by one having the necessary adverseness." Id. Although Sierra Club has
demonstrated that it qualifies under this second test, IPSC mistakenly argues and the
Board incorrectly found that Sierra Club is not the "most" appropriate plaintiff and
therefore does not have standing.
Initially, it is important to note that Nat'l Parks, the seminal case on this point,
representing this Court's formulation of the second standing test, does not use the phrase
"most appropriate plaintiff." Instead, as quoted above, this Court stated that "no one
else" should have a "greater interest in the outcome" of the adjudication. See Nat'l Parks,
can only suffer a concrete injury if the Forest Service or others are undertaking or
threatening to undertake activities that cause or threaten harm to the plaintiffs' protected
interests." Id. at 537. In other words, to have standing, plaintiffs "must show that actual,
site-specific activities are diminishing or threaten to diminish their members' enjoyment
of the designated river segments." Id. Here there is no question whether the government
will undertake an activity that will threaten injury to Sierra Club members. Rather, the
Executive Secretary has already authorized the AO and the emissions from the proposed
IPSC facility. As a result, Sierra Club is entitled to standing based on particularized harm
to its members, caused by permitted emissions that are redressible through an
adjudication of the AO.
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869 P.2d at 913. Under this standard, Sierra Club, whose mission it is to safeguard the
human and natural environment,9 has standing. No other entity has a greater interest in
the outcome of the adjudication of the lawfulness of an air quality permit implicating
health, visibility and the environment.10 Nat'l Parks confirms this. There, this Court
ruled that "although others may also have an interest in the land exchange, it is unlikely
that any other party, given the facts of this case, has a greater interest in asserting that the
state ought to give priority to nonmonetary values in deciding whether to" undertake the
land exchange. Id. Likewise, in the present case, although others may have an interest in
the lawfulness of the AO, it is "unlikely" that any other party has a greater interest in
asserting, before the Board, that the Executive Secretary is legally required to consider
superior technology, set lower emission limits, establish stricter monitoring, demand the
acquisition and use of more specific, accurate data and adequate analysis, allow adequate
public comment, and address greenhouse gases as part of the IPSC permitting process.
See Sierra Club v. Utah Solid and Hazardous Waste Control Bd., 964 P.2d 335, 339
(Utah App. 1998) ("Sierra Club II") (granting Sierra Club standing to raise issues
concerning "endangerment to human health and the environment" as well as safety and
compliance with the law).

9

The mission of the Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club is "to preserve and enjoy the land
and quality of life in Utah and the West." Trimble Aff. ^j 4. The mission of Grand
Canyon Trust is to "protect and restore the Colorado Plateau - its spectacular landscapes,
flowing rivers, clean air, diversity of plants and animals, and areas of beauty and
solitude." Cass Aff. % 5.
10
In any case, Sierra Club has shown that it is the most appropriate "plaintiff to raise its
health, visibility and environmental issues.
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Despite this ready conclusion, IPSC advances two arguments. Both are readily
dismissed. First, IPSC wrongly looks to the statements made by Sierra Club members
rather than the issues Sierra Club raises to suggest that the organization is an
inappropriate plaintiff because it is "not necessarily interested in this specific [IPSC]
power plant...." IPSC Brief at 29. However, Sierra Club's Request for Agency Action,
the pleading in which the organization actually sets forth its claims, raises issues that are
entirely specific to the IPSC AO and the Executive Secretary's legal duties relative to that
AO. In addition, in citing to a single statement in each of the Member Affidavits, IPSC
ignores the scores of declarations contained in those same affidavits that are directed
exclusively at the AO and the emissions from the proposed IPSC facility it approves.
Opening Brief at 14-18.
Second, IPSC suggests that "Millard County and parties like it" are the "most
appropriate" parties to address "health risks, visibility issues, decreased property values,
impacts on national parks" and the like. IPSC Brief at 30-31. Initially, as IPSC points
out, Millard County "supports the IPSC Unit 3 project," id. at 31 (emphasis added), and
therefore plainly lacks the "necessary adverseness" to advance the issues Sierra Club
raises.11 As a result, Millard County and parties like it do not qualify as appropriate

11

IPSC also incorrectly suggests that Nat'l Parks and Sierra Club II are distinguishable
from the present case because people do not live "nearby" National Parks aind the Army
Depot, and therefore "almost by default, environmental groups are as well suited as any
other party to address issues at these facilities because no other parties would be more
directly affected." IPSC Brief at 30. However, in Sierra Club L the Court of Appeals
determined that other parties did have a greater interest in the issues Sierra Club raised
relative to the Army Depot, while in Sierra Club II, it determined Sierra Club had
standing to raise other issues relative to the same facility. Therefore, the court clearly
20

plaintiffs. Sierra Club, however, which possesses the necessary adverseness based on the
issues it raises, does so qualify.
III.

Sierra Club Raises Statutory Issues of Substantial Public Importance that
Are Properly Before the Board.
When faced with the situation most analogous to the present case - an

organization dedicated to protecting the human and natural environment seeking to
challenge an agency decision that threatens environmental values - the Utah courts have
granted standing on the basis of the public importance of the issues raised.

Therefore,

an association dedicated to protecting the beauty of National Parks had standing to
challenge the transfer of a section of state school trust land in Capitol Reef National Park,
Nat'1 Parks, 869 P.2d at 913-14, and the Sierra Club, concerned with human health and
safety impacts, had standing to challenge the approval of the burning of chemical
weapons. Sierra Club II, 964 P.2d at 341 (Utah App. 1998). Based on this precedent,
Sierra Club also has standing here, where it seeks to adjudicate a coal-fired power plant
permit based on issues implicating health, visibility and the environment in a large area
of the state for decades to come.

did not rely on some blanket notion that environmental groups, by default, are
appropriate plaintiffs when challenging governmental actions relative to "isolated"
facilities. IPSC Brief at 30. Again, IPSC mistakenly applies the test, focusing on the
facility rather than the issues relative to that facility raised by an entity seeking standing.
12
Indeed, it could be said that every time environmental plaintiffs sought standing it was
granted on the basis of the important public issue test. This is because after initially
being denied standing to bring a "premature" challenge to "internal procedural
decisions," the organization established it had standing to challenge trial burns at the
weapons depot. Sierra Club II, 964 P.2d at 341.
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To challenge this strong precedent, the Board and IPSC make several
unconvincing arguments. The Board first claims that because there are "numerous other
coal-fired power plants currently permitted in Utah," the Sierra Club's Request for
Agency Action cannot trigger the public interest standing test. Board Brief at 13; IPSC
Brief at 34.13 However, the Board misconstrues the third test. Rather than assessing the
uniqueness and significance of coal-fired power plants, the third test looks at the issues
Sierra Club raises and the claims it makes.14 As these issues have not been previously
raised in this state, they are unique and important indeed. No individual or organization
has previously sought to adjudicate a permit for a coal-fired power plant based on health,
visibility or environmental impacts. No group has, through the permitting process,
sought to protect Utah's National Parks from air pollution, asked for tighter regulation of
mercury emissions, argued for analysis of superior technologies, or challenged the failure
to regulate greenhouse gases in Utah. Thus, even if the fact that several coal plants exist
in Utah were relevant, Sierra Club qualifies for standing on the basis of the unique and
important issues it raises in its Request for Agency Action.15

Even cursory examination of Sierra Club's Brief reveals the organization has not
"water[ed] down" the third standing test. See IPSC Brief at 34. Actually, Sierra Club
addresses each of the three prongs of the relevant analysis. Opening Brief at 47.
14
That the proper focus is on the issues raised, not the subject of the government action is
evidenced in Nat'1 Parks, 869 P.2d at 913. There, the subject matter of the government
action was the transfer of a state school trust section. Plainly, there are thousands of such
state sections and plenty of proposed transfers. What the Court found unique and
important were the issues the conservation group raised - including the proper discharge
of the agency's fiduciary duties and the preservation of the scenic, recreational,
archaeological, and paleontological values on state lands.
15
Similarly, IPSC misunderstands the third test when it suggests that Sierra Club cannot
establish the public significance of the issues it raises by relying on the fact that the IPSC
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Second, the Board asserts that the proper forum for raising significant public
issues is the public comment process leading to the issuance of the AO or the rule making
procedure. Board Brief at 13. The Board misses the point. An adjudication before the
Board is the only means of contesting an AO and therefore of raising issues relative to a
permitting decision before an entity other than the permitting agency. Utah Code Ann. §
19-2108(3) (2004). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court and the EPA both
recognized the critical importance of the having both processes available - the
opportunity for public comment and access to state judicial review of PSD permits.16
See Opening Brief at 34-35 & n.16. Thus, in part because of its steadfast participation in
the AO process, Sierra Club properly seeks the opportunity to adjudicate - in the process
specifically designed to review the actions of the Executive Secretary - the unique and
significant issues it raises in its Request for Agency Action.
IPSC wrongly suggests that Sierra Club v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Div. of Solid
and Hazardous Waste, 857 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 1993) ("Sierra Club I"), where
Sierra Club was denied standing to bring a "premature" challenge against "internal
procedural decisions preceding any public involvement in the permit process," Sierra
Club II at 341 (quoting Sierra Club I, 857 P.2d at 987), is analogous to the present case.
IPSC Brief at 34-35. Indeed, when the question of the propriety of a permit allowing

plant will generate more than one billion pounds of air pollutants during its life. IPSC
Brief at 36. The importance to the public comes from the issues raised by these
emissions and the permit that approved them, such as whether the Executive Secretary
complied with state and federal law relative to the impacts of these emissions on visibility
at Utah's National Parks.
16
See footnote 17 in Sierra Club's Opening Brief at page 31.
2%

burning of chemical weapons had become ripe, the Utah Court of Appeals granted Sierra
Club standing based on the public import of the issues it raised. Sierra Club II at 340.
Here, as in Sierra Club II, there is no premature challenge to an internal procedure, but
rather an attempt to challenge the IPSC AO according to the administrative processes
designed specifically to allow aggrieved members of the public to contest an air
permitting decision. As in Sierra Club II, the Executive Secretary has authorized the AO,
the Board has "fielded public comment" and the Sierra Club "alleges several violations of
Utah law" and challenges the monitoring and assessments "upon which [the] approval[]"
was based. Id. Consequently, Sierra Club has again raised issues of significant public
concern, contesting the permitting of a 950 megawatt coal-fired power plant that will
annually emit thousands of tons of air pollutants and visibility-impairing emissions for
decades to come. See id.17
IPSC is also mistaken when it cites Barnard v. Motor Vehicle Division of Utah
State Tax Division, 907 P.2d 317, 322 (Utah App. 1995), l8 to suggest that Sierra Club
has not raised statutory issues of public import. In Barnard, the Court of Appeals
determined that the discretionary nature of the rules at issue, as well as Barnard's "failure

w

IPSC's reliance on Berg v. State of Utah, 2004 UT App 337, 100 P.3d 261, is also
misplaced. IPSC Brief at 34. There, Berg did not have standing under the third test to
contest Utah's anti-sodomy and anti-fornication laws based on his fears that he might,
some day, be prosecuted under these laws. Id. The Court of Appeals determined that the
"rare instances where prosecutors have used the statutes do not suggest the presence of a
widespread problem requiring judicial intervention in this case." Id. at ^ 19. Unlike
Berg, Sierra raises issues, based, not on anticipation of a government action but on the
Executive Secretary's approval of a specific permit, which are precisely the type of
matters the Board was created to address.
18
IPSC Brief at 34-35.
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to properly frame and explore the real issue before it reaches the appellate court/' meant
that the matter was not suitable for judicial resolution. Id. Here, in contrast to Barnard,
the Sierra Club seeks to enforce statutes, and the regulations that enforce them, that are
mandatory. AR at 008-024. Moreover, Sierra Club, in its Request for Agency Action
has narrowly framed the issues it wishes to present to the Board. Id.19
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the undisputed affidavits of its members and its Request for
Agency Action, Sierra Club has shown it has standing to challenge the AO before the
Board under each of the three tests. Moreover, neither the Board nor IPSC have raised
arguments that suggest a different conclusion. As a result, Sierra Club respectfully
requests an order from the Court reversing the decision of the Board denying Sierra Club
standing to pursue its Request for Agency Action. Sierra Club also asks that this Court's
order state that Sierra Club has standing and that it is entitled to a full and fair hearing on
the merits, before the Board, of its challenge to the Executive Secretary's issuance of the
AO as specified in that Request for Agencv^Action.
Respectfully submitted this 19th of Dec/mber, 2005. / ^ \ J
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IPSC is mistaken when it suggests that it is the statements of the affiant members that
determine whether Sierra Club raises issues of significant public importance. IPSC Brief
at 36. Rather, it is Sierra Club's Request for Agency Action that must be reviewed, as it
is this pleading that sets forth the issues Sierra Club seeks to bring before the Board.
These issues are by no means "generalized" and are indeed specifically focused on the
Executive Secretary's "permitting actions." See id.
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